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untary alienation of his property, by A. Again, it is a maxim of
the law, Sic utere tuo ut alienum -non lcedas, 9 Rep. 59. Enjoy
your own in such a way as not to injure that of another. And
while the maxim undoubtedly refers to the use qf another'sptoperty,
the principle appears to be the same in regard to any right. Broom,
Leg. Max., p. 394, says: "Where rights are such as, if exercised,
conflict with each other, we must consider whether the exercise of.
the right claimed by either party be not restrained by the exercise
of some duty imposed on him toward the other. Whether such
duty be or be not imposed must be determined by reference to abstract rules and principles of law."
The right to vociferate, and to exercise a man's lungs, may be a
right inalienable, and yet, if it injure his neighbors in one of their
substantial rights, as, for instance, the right to peaceably assemble
for public religious worship (Kindred v. State, 83 Tex. 69;
Brown v. State, 46 Ala. 175), or for the purpose of a sale at auction (_urness v. Anderson, 1 Pa. Law Journ. Rep. 324), even that
right may become a wrong. The cause celebre of State v. Einkhan, 69 N. Carolina 214, which seems to hold the contrary, is
only to the effect that the intention to disturb and interfere must be
apparent.
JAmEs APPLETON MORGAN.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Rhode lsland.
JOSIAH CHAPIN v. LUCINDA JAMES ET. AL.
The Supreme Court of a state has no power to enjoin the United States marshal
from proceeding to a sale on execution, although the property levied on is that of
a stockholder in a corporation against which judgment and process of execution
issued ; the execution being levied by direction of attorneys thereon endorsed to
enforce the stockholder's liability under the Rhode Island statute regulating manufacturing corporations.
Notwithstanding the issue of execution the case is pending, and unless otherwise regulated by statute the execution is still under the control of the court.
As between courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the tribunal first acquiring jurisdiction retains it.
As between courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the tribunal issuing process has exclusive control over it.
As between state courts and United States courts, neither can enjoin the process
of the other.
Samble, that the limitations from citizenship imposed on the jurisdiction of United
States courts do not apply to ancillary bills in equity or petitions to protect the
rights of those interested in property in the custody of the court.
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Semble, that such ancillary bills in equity or petitions, may be brought in the
United States courts by any one whose interests are affected by the process.
.BILL in equity. The defendant having obtained from the United
States Circuit Court in a suit in equity, judgment against the Atlantic Delaine Company, took out her execution, and it was in
pursuance of an order of her attorneys endorsed thereon, levied by
the United States marshal on the property of the present complainant, Josiah Chapin, it being claimed that he was a stockholder in
the said corporation at the time the liability accrued, and that she
had the right so to levy it by the provisions of the statute of
Rhode Island regulating manufacturing corporations.
The said Chapin having filed this bill for an injunction
against the United States marshal, to restrain him from selling the
properfy levied on, Mrs. James now moved that the bill be dismissed
on the ground that the state court has no jurisdiction in the case.
James Tillinghast, Benjamin T. Bames and Charles Hart, for
complainant.

,.
. Parsons and Thomas A. Jenckes8, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
POTTER, J.-The complainant contends that in the present case,
so far as concerns the levy on real estate, the property cannot be
considered as in possession of the United States court. That the
complainant, Chapin, was not a party to the suit, and that even if
he was liable as a stockholder, the marshal has no right, on an
execution against the corporation, to levy the execution on his
property, inasmuch as the mode of proceeding provided in the
Manufacturing Corporations Act has never been adopted by any
United States statutes or rule of court; that the execution -as
issued on a judgment in a suit for tort, whereas the stockholder
is only liable in case of contract; that Mrs. James, being a stockholder herself, was not entitled to that process, and that there is no
remedy for the complainant unless this court interferes.
The facts alleged being assumed as true for the purpose of deciding the present motion to dismiss, cannot the complainant raise
in the United States Circuit Court all these and other questions
of law he may make, and have them decided by that court?
Although a decree has been made ia the suit in the United States
Circuit Court, the case is still pending there. The execution is
the process of the court for carrying its decree into effect, and
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except so far as regulated by statute, is still within the court's
control. Courts 'of law anciently by "1audita querela" and on
motion, and latterly more generally by motion, have exercised control over their final process, and courts of equity have always done
so. This is absolutely necessary to prevent the execution of a
judgment or decree in one suit giving rise to a dozen other suits
growing out of questions as to the mode of serving its process.
The suit is not ended by the judgment ; it is still pending : lVegman v. Childs, 41 New York 159 ; Mann v. Blount, 65 N. C. 99,
101; howell et al. v. Bowers, 2 Or., M. &R. 621 ; Spann et al. v.
Spann, 2 Hill's S. C. Ch. 156. So far as the present controversy
is concerned, the question is between courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The suit was in equity, and might have been brought either
in the United States or in the state court ; and it is a principle
too well settled to need authority that in such case the court which
first acquires jurisdiction is to retain it, and is not to be interfered
with by any other co-ordinate court, and that property in possession
of the officers of the court is in possession of the court, and cannot
be levied on by officers under authority of any other court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, whether state or Federal: Eagan v. Lucas, 10
Peters 400; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Id. 136 ; Smith v. Mfelver, 9
Wheat. 582; Mallett v. Dexter, 1 Curtis 178 ; Buck v. Colbath, 3
Wall. 834, 341. Says Mr. Justice McLEAN, in Hagan v. Lucas:
"A most injurious conflict of jurisdiction would be likely often to
arise between the Federal and the state courts, if the final process
of the one could be levied on ptoperty which had been taken by
process of the other." In that case the United States marshal had
levied on property previously attached by the state sheriff.
And see, also, the remarks of Judge GRIER on the jurisdiction
of the Federal and state courts in .Ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wall. Jr.
521-525. And as between state and United States courts, it is
well settled that as a general rule neither can enjoin the process
of the other. In case of conflict of jurisdiction as to cases arising
under the United States Constitution or laws, the Supreme Court
of the United States at Washington is the final arbiter: Diggs v.
Walcott, 4 Cranch 179; McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279;
Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612-625; City Bank v. Skellton, 2
Blatch. 26; Brooks v. Montgomery, 23 La. Ann. 450; and see
Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. I. 453; Coster v. Griswold, 4 Edw. Oh.
364-877; English et al. v. Millar et als., 2 Rich. S. C. Eq. 320;
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and so as to a court of a sister state: Hfead v. MZlerritt, 2 Paige
402-404; 2 Story on Const. (ed. of Cooley), § 1757 ; Story Eq.
Juris. § 900; Conklin's U. S. Courts, 162-272 (4th ed. 1864);
Conklin's U. S. Courts 176, 296 (5th ed. 1870); and see the
very strong expressions of the majority of the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 596.
But it is said by the complainant that in this case an execution
iss.ued against A. has been levied on B.'s property, and that in
such a case a state court may interfere; and he cites 1 Kent
Comment. 410, supported by Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curtis 465;
Greene v. Brigg8, 1 Id. 311. The latter was the case of liquor seized
by an officer under a state law which said Greene replevied out of
the possession of the state officer on a writ brought to the United
States Circuit Court. In that case the question of jurisdiction
was not raised.
Judge KENT cites as his authority Bruen v. Ogden, 6 Halst. N.
J. 370, which was a case of replevin, and Dunn v. Tail, 7 La. Term
R. 416, 3 Martin, La. 602, which latter was an action of trespass
where there could be no actual conflict of jurisdiction, and therefore is no authority for us.
The doctrine contended for by complainant was also held by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in a replevin case: Howe
v. Freeman, 14 Gray 566. But this case was carried up to the
Supreme Court of the United States and there reversed: Freeman
v. Howe, 24 Howard 450, 457; where the opinion was delivered
by NELSON, J., one of the. oldest and most learned and experienced justices of that court. This case, as observed by Mr. Justice
MILLER, 8 Wall. 841, took the profession by surprise, as overruling the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the opinion of Chancellor KENT. But it was upon this
very point expressly affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court in Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 834, 341. It is said that the
marshal on execution against A. has no right to levy on the property of B., which is claimed to be the present case. The very
point decided in these two latter cases was that in such a case the
court from which the process issues must of necessity decide the
question, and the case of Brook8 v. Montgomery, 23 La. Ann.
450, is exactly in point. The decision there was that the state
court would not enjoin the United States marshal from selling
property, on the ground that the property was not the property
VOL. XXIII.-28
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of the defendant in the original suit, but of the person who applies
for the injunction. It is asked if the marshal, on a writ against
A. should arrest B., would not the state court grant relief ? We
think in that case the application should be to the court whose process is abused. Suppose, for instance, a case of disputed identity.
The court issuing the process could decide it, and it could only
lead to an unseemly conflict for another court to interfere.
It is to be observed that there is a great distinction between
actions of replevin and injunctions which actually interfere with
the process of a court, and actions of trespass and case where
damages only are claimed against an officer, in which latter there
is no danger of conflict, and which may be peaceably taken from
the state court to the United States Supreme Court, whose decision
is final: Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 343, 347.
It is argued that in actions of trespass and case the claimant
only recovers damages, whereas he ought to be protected in the
possession of the property itself. The same argument was urged
in Freeman v. Howe, and was overruled.
It is said that here Chapin was not a party to the original suit,
but was a stranger to it, and could have no remedy in the United
States Circuit Court, growing out of the peculiar limitations on
their jurisdiction over parties.
In a state court, and so also in the United States court, but for
the limitation as to citizenship there can be no doubt that even a
stranger who had suffered from the execution of a decree might
obtain relief by petition to the court for an order in the case: 1
Hoff. Chanc. Prac. 89; Platto v. Deuster, 22 Wis. 482, 485,
citing McChord's Heirs v. McClintock, 5 Littell, Ky. 304, where a
person, not a party to a suit, who had been turned out of possession
on the execution, was relieved by petition in the same suit. See
also Dyckman v. Kernochan, 2 Paige 26; Spann et al. v. Spann,
2 Hill S. C. Chanc. 156 ; Lane v. Clark, 1 Clarke (N. Y.) Ch.
307-9. And as to the United States courts, it seems to be settled by the case of Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 460, that
where the process was in a suit at law, a bill on the equity side of
the court would lie to regulate or restrain proceedings, and that
such a bill would be not original but ancillary, and might be
brought by any one whose interests were affected by the process.
And while limiting the relief to parties before the court, or whc
niay come before it, the same court, by Mr. Justice MILLER, in
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.Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, 344. laid down the same rule, viz.,
that persons interested in the possession of the property in custody of the court may by petition make themselves so far parties
as to have their interests protected, although, if it was an original
suit, the qualifications as to citizenship would not be such as to
give the federal courts jurisdiction. See also Dunn v. Clarke, 8
Peters 1; and Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. I. 453. In Christmas v.
Rus8ell, 14 Wall. 69, 80, there are some remarks which might
seem to throw doubt on this view but for the very peculiar circumstances of that case. The motion for a preliminary injunction
must, therefore, be dismissed.
The foregoing opinion seems to rest
upon the most satisfactory grounds,
which are very clearly set forth by the
learned judge. There has been for
many years among the profession a
pretty generally prevailing opinion that
an action against an officer, in tort, for
misapplying process in his hands was not
bringing in question the authority under
which he acted, and was entirely
admissible, even when the officers
concerned in conflicting processes, or
actions, were acting under totally independent jurisdictions. Hence, it has
h~en held, that where the statute regulating actions against sheriffs required
longer notice than in other cases, this
rule will not apply to an action of tort
against a sheriff, for the reason that he
is not sued as sheriff, but as a wrongdoer. And this opinion is incorporated
into the decisions of many of the states.
And in such cases it is held there is no
actual conflict in the processes. This was
the ground upon which the M3assachusetts courtwentin 14Gray566. But it
never seemed very satisfactory, and cannot be made so by any amount of refinement. Tie truth is, that when suit is
brought against any ministerial officer,
for any act claimed to have been done in
the course of the assumed discharge of
the duties of his office, he should be allowed to shield himself by any defence
which the law allows him, as such officer.
If he holds the person or property under
process of a court of competent juris-

diction, he may well claim the protection of that court to the fullest extent,
not only in regard to the validity of the
process, but equally as to its application.
And if the attempt is to draw him into
a foreign jurisdiction for his defence, it
may be quite as important to his immunity that he be allowed to invoke the
shield of his own jurisdiction when he
is pursued as a wrongdoer by reason of
the wrongful application of the process,
as if itwere forsome alleged defect in it.
The cases cited in the opinion seem to
establish this most abundantly so far as
the decisions of the national courts are
concerned. And they seem to us entirely well founded.
The courts of the United States have,
with some recent exceptions, which we
have before had occasion to notice, vide
Watson v. Jones, 11 Am. Law. Reg.
N. S. 430, 452, kept carefully aloof
from any intermeddling with the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts.
Thus in Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103, it
is declared that no court of the United
States can issue a writ of habeas corpus
to bring up a prisoner confined under
state process for any other purpose than
to examine him as a witness. And the
same rule was applied in the matter of
Metzger, 5 How. 176, where the prisoner
was committed to abide the order of the
President of the United States, in reference to his extradition, when claimed
by the French: People v. Fiske, 45
Barb. 294. That court has intended
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to adhere strictly to the settled rule of ceedings of the courts, both state and
the common law in regard to concur- national, which have sometimes the aprent or co-ordinate jurisdictions, viz. : pearance of an exception to the general
Thus a
that the court or authority having first rules of their jurisdiction.
naobtained possession of the subject must mere ancillary proceeding in the
judga
carry
to
order
in
courts,
tional
:
others
all
of
exclude the interference
Icvor, 9 Wheaton 532; ment of that court into effect, may be
Smith v.
had in that court without regard to the
Shelby v. Bacon, 10 How. 56.
So that where co-ordinate lieps are citizenship of the parties to the parcreated by judgments both in the state ticular proceeding: Reil.y v. Golding,
v. Brown,
and Federal courts, the seizure by the 10 Wall. 56 ; O'Brien County
proceedsimilar
a
And
588.
1
Dillon
court
sheriff gives priority to the state
cannot be removed
lien: Pulliamv. Osborne, 17 How. 471. ing in a state court
of
And the first levy upon property,whether into the Circuit Court, under the Acts
parties
made under state or Federal process, Congress, notwithstanding the
citizens of different states :
withdraws the property from the reach may be
Bank v. Turnbull, 16 Wall. 109. And
of process from the other jurisdiction:
the state courts have always been acHagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400.
And where land is in the hands of the customed to discharge minors enlisted
without the
receiver of the Court of Chancery, under into the United States army
or consent of the parents, a
a proceeding to set aside a conveyance knowledge
which would seem more appro.
upon the ground of fraud against cre- function
national courts: Ra
ditors, it is not competent for other priate for the
390: Xc(onologue's
Wis.
25
Tarble,
creditors to levy upon the land : T/isSo too Case, 107 Mass. 154, where the cases are
wall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52.
But see Comwhen the Supreme Court of the state cited very extensively.
7 Phila. Reports
has taken possession of the property and monwealth v. Selfridge,
; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, where
franchises of a corporation and ordered 76
is reversed upon the
them sold, they cannot be taken in ex- the Wisconsin case
thus curing this
us,
by
stated
grounds
ecution by process from the United
anomaly after it had existed for a long
States courts: Fox v. Hempfield Ry.,
period and received the support of the
2 Abbott's U. S. 151. And liens existablest state courts in the land, embraing in the state courts are not suspended
cing New York, Pennsylvania and Masby proceedings in bankruptcy: Baum v.
sachusetts, Chancellor KEST forming
Stern, 1 So. Car. N. S. 415. So if the
the only dissentient from the doctrine.
United States courts issue mandamus to
We may suggest here what seemed
tax,
a
levy
to
county
a
of
the supervisors
us a great anomaly during the war,
to
the state courts cannot enjoin them
for the state courts where there was no
the
of
mandate
the
obeying
against
suspension of the regular administration
writ, notwithstanding they are excluof justice, to withhold the writ of habeas
Supervisors,
v.
Amy
sively state officers :
corpus in all cases, upon the ground that
i1 Wall. 136. Nor will the repeal of
the national authority had suspended it.
which
under
state,
the
the statute by
It never seemed to us that the action of
they are exposed to a penalty for failure
the national authority, in declaring the
Id.
them:
excuse
to perform their duty,
writ of habeas corpus suspended, could,
And where the United States courts
upon any fair and just construction, be
in
contempt
foi
supervisors
commit the
held to extend to any but the national
refusing obedience to the writ, the state
courts. All the other provisions of the
parte
Ex
relief:
no
courts can give
United States Constitution having referHolman, 28 Iowa 88.
ence to the administration of justice,
But there are some things in the nro-
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whether civil or criminal, have uniformly been held to have reference exclusivelyto proceedings in the National
courts, unless the state courts are
named. These are that trials for crimes
shall be by jury, Art. III., sect. 2; that
prosecutions for capital or infamous
crimes must be by indictment of the
grand jury ; or that no one shall be
subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb, or compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, or be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due
process of law, or private property be
taken for public use without just compensation, Art.V. : Barren v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 ; Fox v. Ohio, 5
How. 434. So in Art. IV. The right
of exemption from unreasonable searchwarrants has been held to apply exclusively to process from the Federal
courts: Smith v. Maryland, 18 How 71.
We might name other provisions of
the United States Constitution having
exclusive reference -to the national
courts, such 'as trial by jury in civil
actions, and the prohibition against requiring excessive bail. But it will not
be useful to specify further. The cases
just cited show very fully that all the
provisions of the national Constitution
which are in general terms, and refer to
proceedings in courts, have reference
exclusively to the national courts. The
idea then that the provision for suspending the writ of habeas corpus by the
national authority would extend to the
state courts, is either entirely without
foundation or else it rests upon special
grounds. But the argument from the
reason of the case seems to show, equally
with the general authorities before cited,
that this provision need form no exception. The words of the provision, Art.
I. sect. 9, are : "The privilege of the
wric of habeas corpus shall not be suspenled unless when in cases of rebellion
or invasion the public safety may require
it." The public safety could only require it in such cases to preclude any

interference with the movements of the
public authorities, and especially the
army, all which in times of war, whether
from invasion or rebellion, must be of
a national character. The state courts
would have no jurisdiction at any time
to interfere with the national authority.
That could only be done by the national
courts, who alone could by habeas corpus
examine into the legality of arrests
made by the national executive through
the army. The effect then of the suspension of the writ would be to place
the national executive and the army,
for the time, above the civil authority.
This was all that the national Constitution ever could have contemplated.
The conduct, then, of some of the state
courts ia withholding the writ of habeas
corpus in all cases, even ad testificandum,
for the period of four years,was certainly
a pure matter of supererogation, and
would have seemed ludicrous but for the
grave solemnity of the crisis through
which we were being hurried. There
was no more law or reason why the
state courts should not have continued
to use the writ of habeas cospfis in all
cases coming within their legitimate
jurisdiction than at any other time
before or since, unless it were out of
deference to the public opinion, oras eviOence of patriotism. The state courts
could not indeed have relieved the
members of their seceding legislatures
from arrest under the orders of the
national Secretary of State. But there
was no reason why they could not have
inquired into the legality of the arrest
of a party, or witness, while attending
a state court, or of the detention of an
infant by mere force and against his
will. And still we find almost no cases
of that character during the war. In
Griffin v. I Vlcox, 21 Ind. 370, the court
denied the power of Congress to suspend the writ in state courts, and other
states may have adopted similar views,
but not universally, if indeed generally.
But the discussion of the question of
conflicting jurisdiction between the
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state and national courts is bringing
the profession and the courts to more
perfect comprehension of the subject.
How deep the error had penetrated is
apparent from the dissent of Chief Justice CIuAsE.in Tarble'scase, supra. And
the fact that the proclamation issued by

the national authority suspending the
writ was broad enough to reach the state
courts, would be of no importance be
yond the proper limits of- the national
authority. It could not affect courts
over whose ordinary jurisdiction it had
I. F. It.
no control.

Boardfor the Determination of Contested -Elections. Kentucky.
JOHN B. COCHRAN v. T. C. JONES.

1

Under the Constitution of Kentucky the giving, accepting or carrying of a challenge to fight a duel, disqualifies the person so acting for any office of honor or
profit under the state, besides subjecting him to such punishment as may be prescribed by law.
The disqualification and the offence against the laws are separate subjects, and
the Board for the Determination of Contested Elections has jurisdiction to decide
the former, without reference to a conviction for the latter in a judicial tribunal.
A challenge may be accepted orally, although it be in writing.
Where the person receiving the highest number of votes for an office is ineligible, the person receiving the next highest number is not thereby elected, but there
is a failure to fill the office, and a new election must be had.

THIS was a proceeding before the Board for the Determination
of Contested Elections, to contest the right of the respondent to

the office of Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
At the August election of 1874, the contestant and respondent
were respectively candidates for the office of Clerk of the Court

of Appeals. The contestant received 53,504 votes, and the respondent received 114,348 votes, making the majority in favor of
the latter of 60,844 votes, and he therefbre received a certificate
of election.

On September 5th 1874, the contestant served the respondent
with notice, in writing, that he would contest his right to the office

upon two grounds, and that he would himself claim the office.

First. That, previous to the August election, 1874, to wit, on
or about the 6th of June 1869, the respondent accepted a challenge from J. Hale, a citizen of this state, to fight him in single
combat a duel with deadly weapons.

Secondly. That he, the contestant, was himself entitled to the
'We give place to this decision upon an interesting and happily unusual subject,
though it is not the judgment of a court. It is, however, the decision of a tribunal
having final jurisdiction of the subject, and which is composed in the present case
of distinguished lawyers.-ED. Am. Lkw REG.
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office, because he had received a greater number of votes than any
other person voted for, who was constitutionally and legally eligible to hold said office.
The parties proceeded to take proof by depositions, touching the
grounds specified in the notice, and having complied with the requirements of the statute in all the initial proceedings, brought
the case properly before this Board.
TIrE BOARD, consisting of the Governor, Hon. P. H. LESLIE,
Attorney-General Hon. JOHN RODMAN, Secretary of State Hon.
G. V. CRADDOCK, State Treasurer Hon. J. W. TATE, and Auditor-General Hon. D. HOWARD SMITH, having considered the case,
the majority, consisting of the Governor, Attorney-General and
Secretary of State, filed the following opinion:The first question claiming our consideration is one of jurisdiction. Has this Board the authority to adjudicate upon the questions raised by the notice of contest, especially the ineligibility of
Jones resulting from the alleged acceptance of a challenge to fight
Dr. Hale in single combat with deadly weapons ?
It was contended by the counsel for the respondent that we had
no authority to inquire into the fact whether he had accepted a
challenge, because, if true, it was a penal offence, and, without a
judgment of conviction of a court of competent jurisdiction, it
could not be inquired into by this Board. It therefore becomes
necessary for us to examine the law by which this Board is organized, and also what powers and duties have been conferred or imposed upon it.' * * * *

Section 20, article 8, of the Constitution, declares that "any
person who shall, after the adoption of this Constitution, either
directly or indirectly, give, accept, or knowingly carry a challenge
to any person or persons, to fight in single combat with a citizen
of this state, with any deadly weapon, either in or out of the
state, shall be deprived of the right to hold any office of honor
or profit in this Commonwealth, and shall be punished otherwise
in such manner as the General Assembly may prescribe by law."
The statute passed in pursuance of the provision of the Constitution denounces against the party challenging a penalty of from
three to twelve months' imprisonment, or a fine of five hundred
I The review by the Board of the Acts of the Legislature by which it was vested
with jurisdiction in contested elections, being entirely local, is omitted.-ED.
A. L. R.
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dollars, or both. Against the party accepting, from one to si3
months' imprisonment, or a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars,
or both. Against the party carrying or delivering the challenge,
and the seconds, from ten to thirty days' imprisonment, or a fine
of one hundred and fifty dollars, or both. And, in addition, it is
enacted by the 4th section that " any person convicted of either
of the offences named in the three previous sections shall forfeit
any office be may then hold, and be excluded from and held disqualified from receiving and holding any office, and also from
exercising the right of suffrage within this Commonwealth for seven
years after the date of his conviction.
Besides, another statute gives a right of action for damages to
the widow and minor children of a person killed in a duel, or to
either of them, against the surviving principal, the seconds, and all
others aiding or promoting the duel, or any of them, in which vindictive damages may be given, "for the suppression of the practice of duelling."
This comprehends, we believe, all the legislation upon the subject of duelling. The Constitution, it will be observed, imposes
no penalty other than by declaring that the party shall be deprived
of the right to hold any office of honor or profit in this Commonwealth. This provision of the Constitution was intended to execute itself, and in aid of such intention, the form of the oath was
specifically prescribed by that instrument, which every officer
should take before entering upon his office, commonly called the
"duelling oath :" Horgan, &c., v. Vande, 4 Bush 323; McBride
v. Commonwealth, 4 Bush 321.
It is not provided in the Constitution, as in the statute, that
upon convietion the party shall be deprived of the right to hold
office; but that any one so offending shall, ipsofacto, be deprived
of the right to hold any office of honor or profit. Such would be
the consequence though no statute upon the subject had been
passed.
Can it be maintained that if the legislature had failed altogether to adopt any law in regard to duelling, that the constitutional provision upon the subject would be inoperative? What
have we to do with the statute, or the punishment, or the disabiliThe grounds of disaties prescribed by it? Nothing -hatever.
bility set out in the notice of contest do not grow out of the statute, nor have they any connection with it; nor are they in any
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manner dependent upon any provision of the statute. The only
effect which we can in any possible state of case give to them, if
found to be true, is what the Constitution prescribes, and not what
the statute denounces. Does the Constitution declare the giving,
accepting, or knowingly carry/ing a challenge a penal- offence? If
so, what is the penalty ? If it be the disability to hold office,
then the same penalty is imposed for being a member of Congress,
A minister of the gospel, or for holding office under the Federal
government or a foreign power.
No one will contend, we presume, that it is a penal offence to be
a member of Congress, or a minister of the gospel of Christ ; and
yet, if one happens to be either when elected by the peopl.- to a
state office, he cannot hold or exercise the duties of the office,
because he is declared by the Constitution to be ineligible.
There are many disqualifications imposed by the Constitution,
some applying to particular offices, and others general in their
application. In respect to some a conviction is required, and in
regard to others no previous conviction is made necessary. By
section 3, of article 8, it is declared that "every person shall be
disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit, for the term
he shall have been elected, who shall be convicted of having given
or offered any bribe or treat to secure his election."
Section 4 declares, that "laws shall be made to exclude from
office and from suffrage those who shall thereafter be convicted
of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other crimes or high misdemeanors."
It is declared in section 27, article 2d, "that no person while
he continues to exercise the functions of a clergyman, priest, or
teacher of any religious persuasion, society, or sect, nor while he
holds or exercises any office of profit under this Commonwealth, or
under the government of the United States, shall be eligible to the
General Assembly, except attorneys," &c.; and in section 6, article
3d, it is declared, that "no member of Congress, or person holding any office under the United States, or minister of any religious
society, shall be eligible to the office of governor."
Thus it will be seen that the Constitution, in express terms, requires a previous conviction in respect to some disqualifications,
and as to others no conviction is required. We suppose the framers
of the Constitution made these distinctions understandingly and for
a purpose. They are not distinctions resulting from mere inadvertVOL. XXIII.-29
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ence or accident, but of deliberate design, and in this light we are
inclined to accept them. In the case of M organ, ft. v. Fance,
8upra, the Court of Appeals held, that "so far as the Constitution
requires of all officers to take the prescribed oath, and so far as it
prescribes disqualifications upon acts and not upon judgment of
conviction, the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, executes itself without any extraneous aid by way of legislation, nor
can its requirements be so defeated."
This is not a proceeding to forfeit or to enforce the forfeiture of
the office nor to adjudge any penalty against the respondent for
an offence, either under the Constitution or the statute. We have
no jurisdiction for any such purpose. We have no authority to
try Mr. Jones for a violation of the statute against duelling. We
have no power to render any judgment against him of fine or imprisonment. This Board was not organized for any such purpose.
Its powers and duties are confined to the inquiry whether there
existed, at the time he was voted for, the absence of any of the
qualifications required by the Constitution, or the presence of any
of the disabilities imposed by it. Within this field for scope our
powers, as we believe, are ample. Whether Mr. Jones accepted a
challenge to fight Dr. Hale in single combat with deadly weapons,
before he was voted for as a candidate for the office of clerk of the
Court of Appeals, is a question of fact, and just as any other
question of fact touching his want of the qualifications required by
the Constitution, or his amenability to any of the disqualifications
imposed by it, this Board, we think, undoubtedly has the right to
try and adjudge.
It was not denied in argument that it is within the powers of
this Board to inquire into the fact whether Mr. Jones had been
examined as required by law, and held a certificate showing his
qualifications to discharge the duties of the office for which be was
a candidate. If we may do this, why may we not inquire into the
fact whether he had accepted a challenge? Either fact found
against Mr. Jones would render him ineligible to the office, and
that is the only effect which this Board could give to either.
Because the acceptance of a challenge, in addition to rendering
him ineligible to the office claimed by him, also makes him liable,
under the statute, to a prosecution for a misdemeanor, are we to be
debarred from inquiring into the question whether a challenge bad
been accepted? If found to be true, what other use can we make
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of it, or what other effect can we give to it, than to adjudge that
he cannot hold the office of clerk?
The record of the judgment of this Board would not conclude
TMr.
Jones upon the trial of an indictment against him under the
statute, nor could it be used as evidence upon any such trial. The
judgment of this Board not having the effect of a conviction under
the statute against duelling, nor operating as an estoppel in any
*subsequent trial upon an indictment for the offence, nor competent
as evidence upon the trial of-any such indictment, the consequences
which counsel imagined would flow from it, outside of its effects
upon the rights of the parties and issues in this case, are, as it
would seem, wholly unfounded.
Section 8 of the Bill of Rights declares, "that the ancient mode
of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain
inviolable, subject to such modifications as may be authorized by
this Constitution."
It was also contended in argument, that inasmuch as the acceptance of a challenge to fight a duel was denounced by the statute as a penal offence, and, upon conviction, operated as a disfranchisement of the right of suffrage, as well as to hold office, that the
Legislature was inhibited by the Constitution from creating any
tribunal to try a person for such an offence without the intervention of a jury.
We have, in a former part of this opinion, endeavored to sho'that Mr. Jones is not on trial before us for any offence denounced
by the statute, and we do not now propose to repeat, or to enlarge
upon the reasons leading to that conclusion.
It is clear that the law creating this Board and defining its duties, gives to it plenary jurisdiction to try the contest for the office
between the parties before us, and that, too, without the intervention of a jury.

*

*

*

*

*

*

It remains, therefore, for us to inquire whether the proofs in the
case are sufficient to sustain the charge, to the effect that Jones
accepted a challenge to fight Dr. Hale in single combat with deadly
weapons.
It cannot be expected that we should, in this opinion, do more
than state the substance of the evidence bearing upon and elucidating this question. Much of the evidence is incompetent and
irrelevant, and, in some instances, conflicting.
It appears that Dr. Hale and Mr. Jones, on the 6th day of June
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1869, had a quarrel in the town of Owensboro, of which they were
both citizens, in which violent words were used. On the 6th day
of June 1869, Dr. Hale wrote and sent, by his friend William H.
Woodford, to Mr. Jones, the following note:
"OwENSBoRo, June 6th 1869, 9 A. M.

T. 0. JONES :
"SIR: Your conduct towards me yesterday evening was of so
insulting a character ag to induce me to demand of you that satisfaction which one gentleman should give another. My friend, Mr.
W. H. Woodford, is authorized to receive any communication you
may wish to send me, and to act as my friend in arranging the
preliminaries for a hostile meeting between us.
J. HALE."
"MR.

This note, written by Dr. Hale, was handed to Mr. Woodford
to be delivered to Mr. Jones.
Mr. Woodford proceeded to Mr. Jones's room, and there found
him and W. N. Sweeney, Esq., in company, and he delivered the
note of Dr. Hale to Jones, who received and read it. Woodford
asked Jones whether he accepted, and he replied that he did, and
turned to Sweeney and asked him to act as his friend. Sweeney
said he could not do so, as it would debar him from the practice
of law. Woodford then said to Jones that he could not accept a
verbal answer to Dr. Hale's note, and Jones replied that as soon
as he could procure a friend he would communicate with Woodford.
In about an hour afterwards Mr. Pointer appeared at the room
of Dr. Hale-Woodford and McHenry being present-bearing the
following note, which he delivered to Woodford:
"JUNP 6th 1869.
".IIR. W. WOODFORD: Mr. Phil A. Pointer is my friend. Any

arrangement you make with him will be entirely satisfactory to me.
"Yours, &c.,

T. C. JONES."

This note was in the handwriting of Jones. It was handed by
Woodford to Dr. Hale, who made some remarks about its ambiguity,
and McHenry read it and said it was all right.
Pointer and Woodford then retired to another room in the same
building, and after discussing some propositions for a settlement
of the difficulty, in which they could not agree, they drew up and
signed the following paper :-
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Ky., June 6th 1869.

"I, W. H. Woodford, acting as the friend of Dr. J. Hale, and.
I, Phil. A. Pointer, acting as friend to Thomas C. Jones, do hereby
agree to have our respective principals at the foot of City Wharf
at 4 o'clock, A. M., Monday morning, the 7th of June, and procred thence across the Ohio river to the Indiana shore, and from
there up behind the island lying nearly opposite to the city of
Owensboro. We agree to select the ground after our arrival. The
distance shall be fifteen paces, that our principals shall stand apart,
and that they shall each be armed with a navy revolver; and that
they shall fire at the word one, two, three, to be repeated until one
or both be satisfied.
W. H. WOODFORD,
PHIL. A. POINTER."

This paper was signed in duplicate; one taken by Woodford and
one by Pointer. These gentlemen then separated. In the meantime information of the pending duel had become notorious in the
town of Owensboro, and some of the most prominent citizens of
the town made an ineffectual effort to settle the difficulty. Pointer
returned to Jones, and in order to prevent him from being arrested,
took him to his father's house, a short distance above Owensboro,
on the river.
Woodford also made arrangements to take Dr. Hale out of town;
but Hale was arrested at the livery stable while waiting for his
horse to be harnessed, and was put under bond. In the course of
the same evening, after night, the officer went to the house of
Thos. Pointer and called for Jones, who, with Phil. A. Pointer and
Thomas Pointer, came out to the gate, when the officer said to
Jones that he bad come to arrest him; and Jones asked him what
for; and he replied, that frorq information, he and Dr. Hale were
engaged to meet in deadly conflict next morning. Jones then
asked the officer what he wanted him to do. The officer said, "I
want you to give a bond to keep the peace and not meet in that
engagement." Jones asked what would be the amount of the bond.
The officer said $10,000. Jones said the bond was a large one;
to which the officer replied, that Hale had given one of that
amount, and he exacted the same from him. Jones asked until
next morning to execute the bond, which was granted; and he did
on next morning execute bond. Pistols had been procured, cleaned
and loaded, and skiffs to carry the parties across the river.
Jones was at the time a candidate for the office of Clerk of the
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Daviess County Court, which candidacy he would of course have
been under obligations to decline in the event he accepted the
challenge, as it would have rendered him ineligible to the office.
This was fully explained to him by Mr. Sweeney, and it would
seem that, after Woodford left, Jones made up his mind not to
fight a duel with Dr. Hale under any circumstances, and expressly
instructed his friend Pointer, at the time of intrusting him with
his note in reply to Dr. Hale's challenge, not to commit him to a
duel. But this determination was not communicated to Woodford
or Dr. Hale; but, on the contrary, was carefully and studiously
concealed from them.
Pointer states in his deposition that he did not read the note of
Jones in reply to Dr. Hald's challenge, although there was nothing
to have prevented him from doing so; nor did he at any time communicate to his principal that he had violated instructions, and had
actually arranged for a hostile meeting on the morning of the next
day; nor does it appear from Pointer's deposition that Jones
asked him for any information in regard to what had transpired
between Pointer and Woodford, or that Pointer communicated any
to Jones.
Pointer states further, that he did not make any arrangements
to secure a pistol, or a surgeon for his principal, or a skiff or other
craft to cross the river next morning. They, Pointer and Jones,
were together nearly all day the 6th of June 1869 ;. drove to Thos.
Pointer's in a buggy together to avoid arrest, and remained
together at the house of Thomas Pointer until after night, when
Jones was arrested.
Pointer further states, that he did not believe any hostile meeting would take place; that it was a game of bluff upon the part
of Dr. Hale and his friends, and that he intended to meet bluff
with bluff.
We do not deem it necessary to dwell longer upon the details
of the evidence, inasmuch as we have stated what we conceive to
be the substance of so much of it as bears upon the question of
fact which we are called upon to decide, viz.: Did Jones accept a
challenge to fight Dr. Hale in single combat with deadly weapons?
The note addressed by Dr. Hale to Jones is certainly sufficiently
explicit to indicate his purpose and the redress which he demanded.
He not only demanded the satisfaction which was "due from one
gentleman to another" for what was assumed to be a gross insult,
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but be was still more specific, by clearly designating the character
of the redress sought-a "hostile meeting between us." There
could be no mistaking or misunderstanding of the meaning of .this
note. It was presented to Mr. Jones by an accredited friend of
the writer, in the usual mode of conducting such warfare; and
Jones, after reading it, being asked whether he accepted, replied
that he did.
It was not necessary to complete the offence that a duel should
be actually fought. Nor was it necessary that the acceptance
should be in writing. An acceptance in writing may be usual, and
probably is. In a matter so important to the parties concerned,
we suppose it would be prudent to require a writing as the best
evidence of the acceptance; but a writing is not required by the
Constitution, and we do not deem a writing to be necessary tc make
the offence complete.
But a writing was given afterwards, and, so far from withdrawing or modifying the previous acceptance by parol, it but confirms
and ratifies it; and still further, the friend and bearer of the writing, and who was fully accredited by it, met the friend of Dr. Hale
and agieed with him upon the time and place at which the hostile
meeting was to transpire, and the weapons with which the fight
was to be made. Nothing remained to be done but for the parties
to take their places and shoot at each other, as had been agreed
upon, until one or both were satisfied. And though it be conceded
that the arrangement made between Pointer and Woodford for a
hostile meeting of their respective principals was without authority
on the part of Pointer, and that Jones was not bound or concluded
by it, still, if he bad previously accepted Dr. Hale's challenge to
fight, the disability denounced by the Constitution attached, whether
he intended to fight or not. A party may accept a challenge
under a reasonable expectation that it will never culminate in a
fight. The offence is complete upon the acceptance of a challenge to
fi.qht a citizen of this state, in single combat, with deadly weapons.
Whether the acceptance be made in good or bad faith, or 'whether
it be couched in ambiguous terms, or whether it be direct or indirect, if designed to be understood by his adversary as an acceptance, and is so understood and regarded by him, it is an acceptance
within the meaning of the Constitution. No secret mental reservation, or ulterior purpose inconsistent with what the acceptance
implies or is understood to imply, can be relied upon.
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It may be, and doubtless is, true, that when Jones informed
Woodford that he* accepted the challenge, he was excited, and
spoke under the impulse of the moment; yet he did not, upon
more mature deliberation, withdraw his acceptance or authorize
Pointer to do so, nor was it withdrawn. pointer did not intimate
to Woodford or to Dr. Hale that Jones had changed his mind; but
on the contrary, told them if they wanted a fight they should
have it.
It is insisted, however, that as Woodford refused to receive a
verbal response to Dr. Hale's note, Jones's verbal acceptance ought
not to be regarded as an acceptance within the meaning of the
Constitution. If it was not an acceptance, what was it? It was
not objected to upon the part of Woodford because it was not in
terms an acceptance, but because he wanted the evidence of the
acceptance in writing.
If it be true that Jones did not intend to accept the challenge,
nor to fight a duel at the time he asked Mr. Sweeney to act as his
friend, why did Sweeney refuse to do so ? Sweeney must have
understood that an acceptance was intended, else he would not
have made the reply, to the effect that he could not act because it
would debar him from the practice of law; for he, as a lawyer, certainly knew that if Jones only wanted a friend to adjust the matter
amicably with Dr. Hale, and in no event to commit him to a duel,
there would be no danger nor impropriety, so far as we can see, in
his undertaking such a mission. In fact, he did, in a short time
afterward, draw up a scheme of adjustment, to which he and other
prominent citizens signed their names, and urged its acceptance
upon the parties.
If it be true that Jones did not intend to accept the challenge,
and in no event to fight a duel, why did he and Pointer leave
town to prevent an arrest? Why need he fear an arrest, when he
had resolved neither to accept nor to fight? It seems to us somewhat inexplicable why Jones, upon Pointer's return from his interview with Woodford, did not inquire of him what had been done,
or why Pointer did not deem it a matter of sufficient importance to
communicate to Jones the result of his mission. It occurs to us that
the nature of the business was of a character calculated to inspire
intense anxiety and solicitude on the part of Jones, and yet, so
far as we can see from the testimony of Pointer, there was apparently an utter indifference on the part of both of them-so much
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so that Jones did not ask, and Pointer did not explain, what had
been done, although they were together during the greater part of
the evening of that day.
And further, when the officer, after night, went to Thomas
Pointer's house, and called Jones out to the gate and informed
him that he had come to arrest him, because he had been informed
that he (Jones) was to meet Dr. Hale next morning in deadly conflict, Jones did not appear to be the least surprised at this announcement, nor did he deny it; but consented, after being told
that Dr. Hale had been arrested and put under bond, to execute
bond himself next morning.
If Jones did not, previous to this, understand that Pointer
had made arrangements for him to fight the next morning, it would
seem that nothing would be more natural than for him to disclaim
any such purpose, and at once call upon his friend Pointer, who
was standing near, either to corroborate the truth of his disclaimer,
or to explain what he had done.
It is contended that Jones, upon being admitted to the office by
the Court of Appeals on the 8th day of September last, took the
duelling oath, and that is competent evidence in this case. We are
surprised that such a proposition should be contended for. It cannot be maintained by any authority, or upon any rule or principle
of evidence known to us. Jones was a competent witness, as we
think, and his evidence might have been taken in this case. But
it was not done. It is not for us to inquire why it was not done,
nor perhaps to draw any inference from the omission to do so.
We deem it not out of place, however, to say that his testimony
might have affected the results of the case very materially.
The provisions of the Constitution upon the subject of duelling
were adopted by the Convention upon mature deliberation. The
subject was thoroughly debated by many of the most intellectual
members of the Convention, and the provisions, as we find them
in the Constitution, received the deliberate sanction of that body.
To maintain the Constitution as the supreme law of the land is the
duty of every citizen, and more especially is it the duty of those
those who hold office under it. We cannot afford, nor are we inclined, to ignore our obligations and duties in this respect.
It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to extir
pate, if possible, the practice of duelling in this state. It was a
notorious fact that statutory law had proven wholly inadequate to
VOL. XXII.-30

COCHRAN v. JONES.

prevent the evil, and that a law more permanent and effective
than legislative enactment was necessary. And in order to prevent the preliminary steps towards the fighting of duels, it is declared that any person who shall, directly or indirectly, give, accept
or knowingly carry a challenge, shall be deprived of the right to
hold office, thus denouncing the initial steps in the process of
bringing on a fight.
We are of the opinion, from the evidence, that the respondent,
T. C. Jones, did, on the 6th day of June 1869, accept a challenge
from J. Hale, a citizen of Kentucky, to fight him in single combat
with deadly weapons.
It only remains for us to consider the question whether the contestant, J. B. Cochran, is entitled to the office, or whether it is
vacant.
Subsection 8, article 7, title "Elections," General Statutes,
page 888, enacts, that "Where it shall appear that the candidates
receiving the highest number of votes given have received an equal
number, the right to the office shall be determined by lot, under
the direction of the Board. When the person returned is found
not to have been legally qualified to receive the office at the time
of his election, a new election shall be ordered. Where another
than the person returned shall be found to have received the
highest number of legal votes given, such other shall be adjudged
to be the person elected and entitled to the office."
It is contended by the counsel of Cochran, that inasmuch as
Jones was ineligible to.the office, all who voted for him threw away
their votes, and that he, being the only other person voted for, or
having received the greatest number of votes of any other candidate who was eligible, is entitled to the office.
We have examined the question carefully, and but for the length
which this opinion has already reached, would review the arguments and authorities relied upon by the counsel of the contestant.
Whatever may be the doctrine or practice in England, or in some
of the states of the Union, we are satisfied that our statute is conclusive of the question in this state.
.There is no ambiguity-in the section quoted. The intention of
the Legislature is, we think, perfectly manifest. It will be ob.served tthat three states of cases are provided for.
First. .A between the candidates receiving the highest, but an
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equal number of votes, the right to the office shall be determined
by lot.
,Second; If the candidate receiving the highest number of votes
be inelgible, then a new election shall be ordered.
Third. If the contest is between candidates eligible to the office,
then the one who has received the highest number of legal votes
shall be entitled to the office.
. If the Legislature had intended, that in case where there was a
contest between candidates, and it should appear that one of them
was ineligible, that the other, although receiving a less number of
votes, should be entitled to the office, it was easy to have said so.
Such is not, however, the language of the section, nor can any
such conclusion be drawn from it; on the contrary, it appears, that
in just such a case as the one now under consideration, it is expressly declared that a new election shall be ordered: Simmons v.
Hinton, 1 Duv. 40.
We are clearly of the opinion that the contestant is not entitled
to the office.
It is therefore considered by this Board that Thomas C. Jones
is ineligible to hold and exercise the office of Clerk of the Court
of Appeals, and that the contestant, J. B. Cochran, is not entitled
to said office; and it is further considered and adjudged. that the
said office is vacant, and a new election is hereby ordered.
The minority of the Board filed an opinion dissenting from the
foregoing conclusions, on the grounds:
First, that the verbal reply by the respondent to Woodford
having been objected to by the latter was withdrawn and was not
under the circumstances an acceptance of the challenge, and the
testimony showed that Pointer's instructions from the respondent
were not to commit him to a duel. The offence therefore was not
made out.
Secondly, that even if the evidence were clear on the first point,
the Constitution makes duelling a crime and prescribes deprivation
of the right to hold office as a punishment; and under the Constitution of Kentucky punishment for crime can only be inflicted after
indictment and conviction by a jury in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The question of jurisdiction -here de.
cided is, we believe, entirely novel and

not devoid of difficulty. Without wishing to question the correctness of its
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conclusions we must observe that the
majority of the Board hardly answer
the objection that the disqualification of
duellists under the Constitution of Kentucky is a punishment. If the object
of those who made the Constitution was
to discourage duelling, if the disability
was created, as is said in the opinion of
the Board, to supplement the penal laws
which were found ineffectual, then it
does seem that it is of the nature of a
punishment; and the disability of 'clergymen and of federal officers obviously
not created with this view is not parallel.
But it is going too far to say that this
was the object of the provision, or at
least th sole object. In South Carolina
an Act of 1812 attached the same disability to those convicted of duelling or
challenges to fight. In The Stale v.
Dupont, 2 McCord 334, it was urged
that the law was unconstitutional, on
what ground does not appear in the
report, but probably because the punishmentwas cruel or unusual. HUGER, J.,
decided, however, that the disqualification for office was no part of the penalty,
but a result flowing from conviction.
The better position for the Kentucky
Board to have taken would seem to be
tht the disqualification of duellists in
their state was imposed for political
reasons rather than created in terrorem.
By the common law killing in a duel
is murder, in principal and seconds,
whether challenging or challenged: I
Hale P. C. 452, where the decision of
Sir EDWARD CoKE in Taverner's Case,
3 Bulstrode 171, is cited. The giving
or receiving a challenge to fight is indictable at common law as tending to
make others break the peace: 4 Black.
Com. 144 ; Rex v. Rice, 3 East 581.
In none of the American states, so far
as we know, is the common law altered, except in California, where homi.cide in a duel is not murder, but a
statutory offence: Terry.v. Bartlett, 14
Cal. 657 ; but in nearly all of them
there are strict legislative enactments

declaring and enforcing the common
law, and often constitutional provisions
similar to that of Kentucky.
The severe penalties denounced against
all concerned in challenges to fight;
those who give, those who accept, and
those who carry them or perform any of
the usual duties of seconds ; make it an
important question what constitutes the
offence under the statutes.
Challenges to fight with weapons not
deadly, as with fists, are obviously not
within the spirit of the statutes, if even
within their letter, and the indictments
always allege that the weapons were to
be deadly.
It has repeatedly been held that no
pqrticular form of words is necessary to
constitute a challenge, and it is generally immaterial whether the offer be
written or oral. It is necessary, however, that the proposition should be a
serious one, and not by way of banter
or braggadocio; and the question of
intent is for the jury. Thus in The
State v. ,Strickland, 2 Nott & McCord
181, the defendant, as the prosecutor
expressed it, " bantered him to go out
into the old field to fight a duel," to
which he replied he did not fight in that
way, and that he had no gun. Defendant told him to go and get a gun,
and offered to lend him ammunition.
Other witnesses denied that the defendant used the word duel. It appeared
that he said he would defeat the prosecution as the law required a written
challenge. The question was submitted
to the jury whether there was sufficient
proof of a challenge to fight with deadly
weapons, or whether it was a mere
effusion of passion and expression of
empty threats without any serious intention or expectation of a duel. Upon
a verdict of guilty, the court in bane
refused a new trial. In Ivey v. The
State, 12 Ala. 277, the same principle
was decided. The defendant came to
the prosbeutor and told him he had
come to have a difficulty with him, and
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would fight him in any way and in any
general character of a requisition, deplace, and a few minutes afterwards
mand or request, to fight with deadly
laying his hand on a pistol told the
weapons. The expression of a readiprosecutor to prepare himself. The jury
ness to accept a challenge does not
having been directed by the judge to
amount to a challenge, though it mVy to
determine whether a fight with deadly
a misdemeanor at common law: Cornweapons was intended, the charge was
monweath v. Tibbs, 1 Dana 524. In
sustained on error by the Supreme
this case the defendant had said to
Court. To the same effect is State v.
another, "'I will fight you with a pistol
Perkins, 6 Black. 20.. Conunonwealth v.
or a rifle from one step to a hundred
Hart, 6 J. J. Marshall 119, was a case
yards," and it was held that the jury
where a letter of the defendant alleged
were entitled to acquit. This principle
to be a challenge was excluded from
is recognised in Aulger v. The Stare, 34
evidence on the ground that its contents
II1. 486, one of the latest American
did not amount to a challenge within
cases on the subject.
the meaning of the statute, and conseThe place where the duel was to be
quently did not conduce to support the
fought need not be averred or proved ;
charge contained in the indictment. the offence
against the public peace is
The Court of Appeals reversed the court
complete when the challenge is given.
below on the ground that the lettdr
In Iley v. The State, the offer was to
should have been submitted to the jury.
fight in any place; in The State v.
UNDERWOOD, J., saying, however, in
Taylor, 3 Brevard 243, the challenge
delivering the opinion: "The letter of
was given in South Carolina to fight in
Hart contains upon its face enough to
Georgia ; in The State v. Farrier, I
show that if it really was his intention
Hawk. 481, the challenge was in North
to challenge Twiman to a combat with Carolina to fight in South
Carolina. In
rifles, it was a procedure very different all these cases the jurisdiction of
the
from the ordinary course taken by locality of the challenge was upheld.
duellists. There were no seconds proIn Commonwealth v. Bort, Thacher's
vided, and it is singular that one man Criminal Cases
390, there was a chalshould challenge another to meet him lenge in Massachusetts
and a duel in
alone, and that they should by them- Rhode Island. It was held
by THAselves end a dispute with rifles and with- cimiR, J., that whatever might
be the
out any friends to prescribe rules or to law of
Rhode Island, the challenge was
see that they were fairly executed. Still, an
offence cognisable in Massachusetts,
anger and desperation might drive a and he cited Rex v. Burdett,
4 B. &
man to such a fight. It is moreover AId. 95, where
it is held that where a
strange that Hart should consent to misdemeanor
is committed partly in one
fight, upon such terms, a man to whom county and partly in another
it may be
in his letters he applies the epithets of a tried in either.
puppy, blackguard and companion for
In an indictment for a challenge it is
negroes. Under this view of the letter not necessary
to set forth a copy of the
the idea suggests itself that the whole challenge, and if it varies
slightly from
affair was no more than a bullying t he original,
preserving the sense, it
farce. * **
Whether this was the de- s eems that such variance is not fatal
:
sign of Hart, or whether in good earnest
State v. Farrier,supra. Probably the
he intended and desired to fight with Iaw laid down by TiACHER, J., in the
rifles and challenged accordingly, be- IBoston municipal court is universal;
longed to the jury to determine."
t hat upon the trial of an indictment for
But alleged challenges must have the s ending a challenge
it is sufficient to
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show that a challenge was sent either v. Pope, 3 Dana 418, was a decision of the
by letter or by word of mouth, without same court in the same term, in which
producing the letter, though if it be the judgment of the court below susaverred that a letter was sent that fact taining a demurrer to an indictment for
must be proved: Commonwealth v. challenging was reversed. The indictHooper, Thucher's Criminal Cases 400. ment contained a copy of the alleged
See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 2 Vir- challenge, apparently merely a demand
ginia Cases 576. In Commonwealth v. for satisfaction, but there were allegaRowan, 3 Dana 397, the indictment tions that the letter was intended and
chafged that the defendant aeepted a understood as a challenge to fight with
written challenge to fight with deadly deadly weapons, and, further, that the
weapons, viz.: with pistols, "which
intent was to fight it, to wit : with
writing," it says, " is as follows," re- pistols. fHeld, that the indictment was
citing a letter which without being more good on its face, for the true intent and
explicit in its object requires "that ulti- meaning of the supposed challenge
mate arrangement customary under such might be shown upon the trial by proof
circumstances," and avers acceptance of oral or written. These last two decisuch challenge by a letter also recited sions are affirmed in two late Kentucky
in full. A demurrer to the indictment cases : Moody v. Commonwealth, 4 Methaving been upheld below the Court of
cIfe 1, and Heffren v. Commonwealth,
Appeals affirmed this judgment, holding Id. 5.
that without this correspondence the
It seems from Commonwealth v. Boot,
charge would have been sufficient, or supra, and .M2oody v. Commonwealth, that
with it had there been an averment that evidence as to the code duello is not adthe parties intended and understood the missible, at least, as was said in the last
letter as a challenge. Then the corres- case, without producing the code; and
pondence would have been evidence, this might be a difficult matter.
and other proof would have been adG. H. F.
missible to show the intention. Corn

United States Circuit Court-EBastern-Districtof rirginia.
UNITED STATES v. PETERSBURG JUDGES OF ELECTION.
UNITED. STATES v. PETERSBURG REGISTRARS OF ELECTION.
The Fourteenth Amendment declares what shall constitute citizenship of the
United States as well as of the several states, and gives Congress the power to
protect the citizen in all the franchises, rights and privileges which belong to him
either as a citizen of the United States or of a state.
The rights which are given to a citizen by a state, such as the right to vote
when possessing certain qualifications, may be modified or taken away by the state,
and the United States cannot interfere, but so long as the right remains,.the
United States has the power to protect him in its enjoyment and exercise.
Rights which do not arise from citizenship but accrue to men as men, such as
the security of life and property, remain under the exclusive protection of the
states.
The Enforcement Act of May 31st 1870, providing for the punishment of obstructing voters, is appropriate legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
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and is, therefore, constitutional ; and an indictment under it charging the prevention of legally qualified citizens of Virginia from voting, and tile refusal to register such citizens as voters is valid and sufficient, although it does not charge that
the acts were done on account of the race, color, or previous condition of servitude
of the citizens.
THESE were demurrers to indictments charging the defendants
with unlawfully preventing certain citizens of Virginia from voting.
The facts are set out ante p. 105, where the opinion of HUGHES,
J., is given. Subsequently the following opinion was filed by

Circuit J.-It is conceded in the argument that had this
been at an election for members of Congress or for Presidential
electors the demurrer would have been bad; or that if the pleader
had charged that the unlawful obstruction was on account of the
race, color or previous condition of servitude of the electors, no
fault could have been found with the indictment. But this was
not at a Federal election, nor does the indictment charge that the
obstruction was made on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.
The question then is whether or not there is constitutional
power in Congress to protect a citizen of the United States qua
citizen in the exercise of the elective franchise either by force of
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Citizenship of the United States prior to the passage of these
amendments was, to say the least, but an ill-defined relation. It
was by many thought to be derivative, and not direct. A person
became a citizen of the United States by force of his citizenship
of some one of the states. It was as a citizen of a state that he
had a right to sue in Federal courts, and hence a large number of
our fellow-citizens during the late civil war were led to think that
as they first became citizens of the state, and indirectly through
that relation citizens of the United States, their allegiance was
first due to the state, and secondarily to the United States.
It seems to me that the object of the first clause of the first see"tion of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle this question of
allegiance for ever, and to make the United States a nation by declaring "that all persons born in the United States are citizens
thereof," owing allegiance upon birth, and that consequently the
power to protect such persons as owed this allegiance belonged to
the United States as fully as the power to protect its citizens for
the purposes of its organization inheres in any other nation.
BOND,
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Whether a person's duty to the state or to the United States is
paramount, was the question fundamental in the war; and after
the expenditure of so much blood and treasure, the people through
their legislatures thought it not right to leave the matter doubtful,
and so declared in this amendment that not only are all persons
born or naturalized in the United States citizens thereof, but are
also citizens of the states wherein they reside, thus establishing
nut only what constituted citizenship of the United States, but, so
far as this description of persons is concerned, what constituted
citizenship of a state.
Congress is empowered to enforce these two relations created by
this amendment by appropriatelegislatiop. It has seen fit since
the adoption of it to legislate upon the right to vote only.
It is objected to this legislation, which, so far as these cases are
concerned, is contained in the 4th section of the Act of May 30th
1870, which provides "That if any person by force, bribery,
threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means, shall hinder, delay
or prevent, or obstruct any citizen from doing any act required to
be done to qualify him to vote, or from voting at any election,"
&c., that the right to vote is not a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States as such, and that, therefore, it does not
come within the power of Congress to .legislate concerning it.
But the Constitution of the state of Virginia declares in its
third article that "every male citizen of the United States, twentyone years of age," who shall have the requisite qualifications, shall
have the right to vote; and now the question is, as the right to
vote at an election in Virginia is not a right absolute, dependent
solely upon citizenship, but a right which the state may modify
and control, has Congress the power, where and while the right is
given, to protect a citizen in the exercise of it?
It may be fairly concluded that what is meant by citizenship of
the state is the same, so far as the power to protect that relation
goes, though it may not be co-extensive in the privileges given, as
is meant by citizenship of the United States.
A state has the undoubted right to cortrol, protect, tax and summon to arms its citizens to promote the objects for which it exists.
And when the Fourteenth Amendment declares that all persons
born within the jurisdiction of the United States are citizens of the
state in which they reside, every such person becomes liable to
these burdens and is entitled to this protection. This will be ad-
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mitted. When the same amendment declares that such persons
are also citizens of the United States, it must mean that they shall
occupy the same relation to the General Government so far as its
purposes are concerned. These purposes we are not left in doubt
about, for the Constitution of the United States declares in its
preamble that the object of the government is to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide
for the common defence, and to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity.
Whatever, therefore, if a state had these objects for its organization, it might require its citizens to do or to refrain from doing
to promote them, it seems to me the United States may require.
The citizenship which owes allegiance to each is now created by
the same paragraph of the Fourteenth Amendment, and each may
summon its citizens to enforce them, or defend them in so doing.
In a republican form of government the duty of voting is as responsible a burden as that of bearing arms. The government cannot
exist without the power to require both; and if it may protect the
citizen in the one obligation, I see no reason, if it be desired to
preserve its existence, it may not do so in the other.
If, therefore, a state, by virtue of a person's relation to it as
citizen, claims, and has always claimed, the right to protect him
in the exercise of a right granted by the United States, surely the
United States is not claiming unlawful authority when it undertakes to protect one of its citizens in a right granted by a state
to him as a citizen of the United States. Now the right to vote
at a Federal election is bestowed by the Constitution of the
United States upon such citizens of the states as have the requisite
qualifications for electors of the most numerous branch of the state
legislature. The state prescribes the qualifications for such electors;
but being designated by the state through qualifications prescribed,
the United States grants them the right to vote at a Federal
election.
Every state by its laws protects its citizens in the exercise
of this right, with which, not the state, but the United States
clothes them.
If this be within the power of the state by virtue of the citizenship of its citizens, why may not the United States protect its
citizens to the fullest extent in a right with which a state clothes
them ?
VOL. XXTIL-31
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But this Fourteenth Amendment goes much farther than this.
It declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United
States are citizens of the state wherein they reside, and that Congress shall enforce this by appropriate legislation.
That which constitutes citizenship, if it be not the mere privilege
of calling oneself citizen, must be the prerogatives, franchises,
rights and privileges which the state governments grant to those
occupying that relation, in return for the performance of the
duties which spring from allegiance and citizenship; and unless
this amendment was inane, fruitless and ineffectual, it must mean
that Congress by appropriate legislation can protect the citizen of
a state in the exercise of all the rights conferred -ipon him as
such, and which distinguish him from those who are aliens or
merely residents in the state.
The exercise of this power on the part of the United States can
in nowise interfere with the right of the state to prescribe the
qualifications of citizens to vote, nor with their privileges and
immunities in any other respect. That power remains as heretofore with the state, with the exception that they shall not make
race, color or previous condition of servitude a ground of distinction. It only asserts the power of the United States in return for
his allegiance to protect the citizen in the rights which the Federal
Government grants, and in such as the states from time to him voluntarily bestow upon him, and which they can continue or withdraw at pleasure.
There is a citizenship of the states and a citizenship of the
United States.
What the states may do by reason of this relationship, the United
States may do. To give any other construction to the clauses of
the 14th Amendment we have been considering, would be to say
that everybody born or naturalized in the United States had a
right to call himself citizen, and that the amendment drew the relation of citizenship no closer than before its adoption; and that in
view of the great contest just over, the people adopted an amendment declaring every one born or naturalized in the United States
a citizen, and that Congress might*enforce that nominal relation,
and the empty claim to be called such, by appropriate legislation.
To overrule this demurrer, it is necessary to claim only that the
sovereignty of the United States is equal in its sphere for the protection of the rights and privileges of citizens, to that claimed by
the states in the protection of their own.
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Nor does this construction of the amendment interfere with the
rulings of the Supreme Court in what is known as the Slaughterhouse case.
The right to slaughter animals within the limits of the city of
New Orleans was not a right appertaining to citizenship at all.
Aliens might do it; but in these cases the right to vote is given to
all citizens of the United States as such, and no one else can exercise it. It is an immunity, a defence, a privilege peculiar to that
relation, and is not shared in common with all persons whatsoever.
It was not personal to a man by reason of his manhood at common
law. It is the endowment of the state, peculiar to citizenship.
Before the state was, men had certain rights which belonged to
them because they were men. As our declaration of independence
declares, men are born with certain inalienable rights.
These rights we do not contend the 14th Amendment empowers
the United States to protect. It is only such rights, privileges and
immunities as the state or the United States confers upon them
because of their citizenship to the United States, that the laws of
the United States can insure.
The fear that this construction will draw into the United States
courts all cases of offences against the person and property of
individuals is groundless.
The rights which are inalienable and belong to men as men, and
not as citizens, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The
right to be secure in one's person or property is not peculiar to
citizenship. Citizens share that with aliens. Offences against
the person as well as those against property are cognisable in
the state courts, except where the controversy arises between
citizens of different states, a choice of forum is given; but all such
privileges as are peculiar to citizenship this 14th Amendment,
it seems to me, was adopted to enforce.
And all that the Supreme Court decided in the Slaughter-house
cases, was that the United States by force of the 14th Amendment
was not clothed with authority to enforce the rights common to all
men, but those only peculiar to citizenship.
The right to vote is not the common right of all persons resident in Virginia. It is not the right of all citizens of Virginia per
se, because a person might be a citizen of Virginia who is not a
citizen of the United States, and the Constitution of the state
confers the right to vote upon citizens of the United S tates solely,
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The demurrer- insists upon it, that as the state has passed no law
abridging the right of citizens in any particular, the indictment is
bad. This view leaves out of consideration the final clause of the
14th Amendment, which empowers Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation. The mischief to be prevented by
the 14th Amendment was the obstruction of the citizen in the
exercise of the rights of citizenship, whatever they from time to
time might be. There is no way as yet pointed out by which a
state can be punished, and the mischief sought to be prevented
might be flagrant in violation of state law, or without any color of
authority under it.
The white people in Virginia might, without law or in spite of
it, determine that no colored man should vote, and the colored
people in South Carolina might, in the same unlawful manner,
unite to violently obstruct their white fellow-citizens from exercising the elective franchise. The mischief to be prevented would
be flagrant, and yet if this demurrer be good, no remedy could be
found. Now Congress, in this view of the case, has thought it
appropriate legislation to punish the individuals who commit the
wrong, whether under color of state authority or without pretending
to any authority at all. Who can say that this is not appropriate
legislation ?
It remedies the existing evil; and a law which accomplishes or
tends to accomplish a purpose required by the Constitution to be
effected, cannot be said by a judicial tribunal to be inappropriate:
Fugitive Slave Law, Act Sept. 18th 1850.
In answer to the objection that these indictments do not allege
that the obstruction had was done on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, it is sufficient to say, that the statute under which the indictments are drawn uses no such language;
and it is most generally sufficient in setting out in pleading a statutory offence, to use the words of the statute creating it.
But if it be contended that the only power Congress had to pass
the statute was that granted by the 15th Amendment, which prevents discrimination among voters on account of race, color, or
previous condition, &c., and authorizes appropriate legislation to
prevent such discrimination, there is answer to it in this, that it is
impossible to prove, though the fact may be so, if a body of colored
men in South Carolina assault and beat fifty white people at the
polls and prevent their voting, and at the same time knock two
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colored people down, that this was done on account of race or
color. Congress thought to cut the thing up by the roots, and
enacted what is really and practically the only appropriate legislation, as any person who has seen the efforts to enforce this section
must know, that no person shall disturb another at an election to
prevent his exercise of the franchise; and as the greater includes
the less, if he can do so from no motive he cannot do it because of
race, color, or previous condition, &c.
And from these considerations we have drawn the following conclusions :
1st. That by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution the
people have provided a citizenship to the United States direct,
positive and paramount, springing from birth within its jurisdiction, or by statutory naturalization.
2d. That what the states have claimed to do by virtue of their
sovereign power over their citizens, the United States may do over
its citizens by virtue of its sovereign power and the direct relationship thus established.
3d. That while the 14th Amendment, in furtherance of this
view, declares that no state shall make or enforce any law contrary
to this provision, it likewise declares that Congress shall enforce
the amendment by appropriate legislation. And that as Congress
cannot punish a state qua state, it is appropriate legislation within
the meaning of the statute to attain its end, i. e. the protection of
the citizen in his right to vote by punishing the individuals who
obstruct him in its exercise.
And that even under the Fifteenth Amendment, where experience has shown the obstruction of voters on account of race and
color cannot be, in the judgment of Congress, otherwise prevented,
it is appropriate legislation to provide by statute that no such obstruction shall take place at all.
And that this construction of the 14th anid 15th Amendments
does not affect the rights of the states to define the rights of citizenship, nor does it draw into the jurisdiction of the United States
courts the question of the invasion of the rights of persons or
property, as such. It concerns only the rights which distinguish
persons as citizens, and which they hold in that character.

RODGERS v. OMAHA HOTEL CO.

Supreme Court of NYebraska.
MILTON RODGERS v. OMAHA HOTEL CO., AND OTHERS.
A mechanic's statutory lien for work done and material furnished in the erection of a house is assignable.
The difference between statutory liens and common-law liens depending on possession, discussed.

S QIILTON .RODGERS filed his petition in the District Court of
Douglas county against the Omaha Hotel Company and lienholders thereon, seeking to foreclose a certain mortgage on the
hotel owned by said company. Samuel Cafferty, Richard Withnell
and John Withnell, three of the defendants, answered said petition, setting forth that they and one Kahler had furnished certain
materials and performed certain labor in and about the erection of
said hotel in pursuance of a written contract, and that on the 9th
day of November 1872, they filed an account of such labor and
material in the office of the county clerk 1of said county. The
court found that there was due said defendants the sum of $10,000,
and the same was a valid and subsisting lien on the hotel building
and the lots on which it stands, and that said lien had been assigned
by said defendants to one Charles W. Hamilton, with authority to
prosecute the same to judgment. The case was brought here by
appeal.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MAXWELL, J.-The only objection raised by the plaintiff is,
that a mechanic's lien cannot be assigned so as to entitle the
assignee to maintain an action to foreclose the lien.
Liens of this kind were clearly defined and regulated in the civil
law, but were unknown to the common law. The proceeding is
entirely statutory. The common-law righ t of lien arose in three
cases. First. When the bailee had bestowed labor or expense to
alter or improve chattels. Second. When the bailee was compellable to receive the chattel, as in case of a carrier. Third. When
the party in possession had saved the chattel from peril by sea, or
had recovered it after actual loss at sea, or capture by an enemy:
2 Cooley's Blackstone 452, note. In all these cases possession
was necessary to enforce the lien, and if the bailee parted with
the possession, his lien was gone. The courts have held that these
liens are personal, and cannot be transferred, and it is sought to
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apply the same principle to mechanics' liens. At common law the
assignment of a chose in action was entirely prohibited: Coke
Littleton 266, a.; 10 Coke 47; Greenby and Kellog v.
ilcocks,
2 Johns. 1; Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch 347; although in equity,
the assignee might maintain an action in his own name; such an
assignment being regarded as a declaration of trust and authority
of the assignee to reduce the interest to possession. In the case
of Master v. Aliller, 4 T. R. 320, the court held "it is true that
formerly the courts of law did not take notice of an equity or
trust, for trusts are within the original jurisdiction of a court of
equity; but of late years it has been found productive of great
expense to send the parties to the other side of the hall. Wherever this court has seen the justice of the case has been clearly
witl the plaintiff, they have not turned him round on this objection. Then if this court will take notice of a trust, why should
they not of an equity? It is certainly true that a chose in action
cannot strictly be assigned, but this court will take notice of a
trust, and consider who is beneficially interested;" and although
an action was thereafter permitted to be maintained in the name
of the assignor for the use of the assignee, yet assignments were
not favored at law. Section 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that the "assignee of a thing in action may maintain an
action thereon in his own behalf without the name of the assignor."
Section 42 provides that "in case of transfer of interest, the
action may be continued in the name of the original party, or the
court may allow the person to whom the transfer is made to be
substituted in the action." An action of this kind can be maintained by the assignee, unless the lien is strictly personal, so that
it is lost the moment it is transferred. Our statute provides that
after the account is made and filed as required by law, it "shall
from the commencement of such labor, or furnishing such material,
and for two years after the completion of such labor, or furnishing
such materials, operate as a lien on the several descriptions of
structures and buildings and the lots on which they stand." Its
continuance in no sense depends on retaining possession of the
property. It is as complete and ample security for the payment
of the debt, as a mortgage of the same interest. It depends on
no contingency for its continuance during the time prescribed by
the statute.
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"There are three points to be considered in the construction of
all remedial statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.
That is, how the common law stood at the making of the act; what
the mischief was for which the common law did not provide; and
what remedy Parliament hath provided to cure this mischief.
And it is the business of judges so to construe the act as to
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy": 1 Cooley's
Blackstone 86.
The object of the law being to secure the claim of those who
have contributed to the erection of a building, it should receive
the most liberal construction to give full effect to its provisions. In
many cases those furnishing labor or materials are men of scanty
means, depending on their contract with the owner for payments
as the -work progresses, and the owner failing to discharge his just
obligations, the contractor is compelled to assign his right to the
money under the contract to raise sufficient means to fulfil his
agreement. The fault is with the owner. Shall he be permitted
to take advantage of his wrong and have the lien declared invalid
because assigned ? Under our law the assignee is subrogated to
all the rights of the assignor, and may maintain an action in his
own name. In the case of Goff v. Papin, 34 Mo. 177, under a
statute that appears to be similar to our own, the court held that
the assignee of a mechanic's lien and demand is a party to the
contract by substitution, and can enforce Iit by suit without joining
his assignor. There is a clear distinction between common-law
liens and a lien of this character, they being essentially secret in
their character and depending on the pOssession of the property
for their continuance; this is a matter of record and notice to all
the world of its existence, and dependent on no condition for its
continuance. With all due deference to the authorities cited by
the appellant, we are clearly of the opinion that a mechanic's lien
can be assigned, and that the assignee takes all the rights of the
azsignoy.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.

